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1. Introduction 
Throughout his career, Malcolm Sawyer has maintained an active interest in the 
development and promulgation of Kaleckian macroeconomics. Almost 30 years ago, in 
Macro-Economics in Question (Sawyer, 1982), he advocated a Kaleckian alternative to 
the then-prevalent mainstream Keynesian and Monetarist views of the economy. This 
alternative featured (inter alia) explicit description of cost-plus pricing by firms and wage 
bargaining by workers in a non-marginalist theory of value and distribution. It also 
emphasized the importance of both accelerator effects and (drawing on the impact of 
Kalecki’s principle of increasing risk on the financing of investment) the rate of profit for 
the determination of aggregate investment. Both of these are now, of course, staple 
features of the canonical Kaleckian model of growth and distribution (on which see, for 
example, Blecker, 2002).
1
  At the turn of the millennium, Malcolm argued that there had been various 
changes in the structure of capitalist economies to which Kaleckians needed to pay more 
attention (Sawyer, 1999). These included changes in the relationship between finance and 
industry – the process of “financialization” – a topic to which Kaleckians have since 




                                                 
1 This canonical model is usually traced to Del Monte (1975), Rowthorn (1981) and Dutt (1984). 
 More recently, Malcolm has contributed to the literature that analyses the 
interaction of demand and supply in the Kaleckian approach to growth and distribution 
(Sawyer, 2010 – see also Dutt, 2006), an approach that, since its inception, has also been 
refined and extended to include analyses of the interaction of growth, distribution and 
2 See also the earlier contributions of Dutt (1992), Dutt and Amadeo (1993), and Lavoie (1992; 1995) on 
the incorporation of financial variables into the Kaleckian model.   2 
inflation (Dutt, 1987; Lavoie, 2002; Cassetti, 2002), and even to incorporate the effects of 
advertising and conspicuous consumption (Dutt, 2007). 
  But despite these various developments and Malcolm’s contributions to them, one 
theme that has received scant attention in Kaleckian macrodynamics is the role of 
historical time and uncertainty in shaping the economy’s growth path. Under conditions 
of uncertainty, economic outcomes (including growth) can be affected by changes in the 
“state of long run expectations” (SOLE) – that is, second order features of the decision 
making process, such as confidence and animal spirits, that cannot be described in closed 
form, but that nevertheless impinge on behaviour independently of the best forecast of 
actual future events that decision makers are able to procure (Gerrard, 1995; Dequech, 
1999).
3
                                                 
3 See, for example, Taylor and McNabb (2007) for a recent empirical assessment of the impact of business 
confidence – a component of the state of long run expectations – on the economy’s growth path. See also 
Starr (2008) for a parallel assessment of the empirical role of consumer sentiment in generating aggregate 
fluctuations. 
 Explicit acknowledgement that historical time and uncertainty are part of the 
fabric of the economy can certainly be found in the Kaleckian literature (see, for 
example, Lavoie, 1992, pp.282-4). But by-and-large, Kaleckians have chosen to adopt the 
modelling strategy of Keynes (1936) who, according to Kregel (1976), sought to “lock up 
without ignoring” the effects of uncertainty on behaviour and hence economic outcomes 
by assuming a given SOLE. In analytical terms, this provides a form of model closure 
that has, in turn, permitted the use of an equilibrium methodology in Kaleckian analysis. 
This, together with the attendant method of comparative statics (or dynamics), has been 
used to good effect to demonstrate the main results of the Kaleckian theory of growth and 
distribution.   3 
  From a Post-Keynesian perspective, however, permitting variability in the SOLE 
is a necessary and important step in the development of Keynesian macrodynamics 
(Kregel, 1976). The purpose of this paper is to take up this challenge in the confines of an 
otherwise canonical Kaleckian growth model. The paper builds on Setterfield (2003), 
who describes a model in which variations in the SOLE affect investment behaviour. This 
model is formally open and hence admits no closed form solution, but is shown to 
suggest the possibility of cyclical growth. In this paper, we: (a) extend the analysis of 
Setterfield (2003) by permitting heterogeneity amongst firms (in particular, with respect 
to changes in their SOLE), thus introducing agent-based features into the analysis; (b) 
simulate the resulting model to show more clearly the aperiodic growth cycles to which 
Setterfield alludes; and (c) explore other features of the model economy (including the 
size distribution of firms) that are not obvious from its basic construction, and that might 
be considered emergent properties of its operation. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model 
on which the paper is based, with particular attention paid to the way in which agent-
based features are incorporated into what is initially an aggregate structural model. 
Section 3 reports our simulation results, and finally section 4 concludes. 
 
2. A Keynes-Kalecki Model of Cyclical Growth 
i) An initial structural model 
We begin with a structural model of the following form: 
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where g
i is the rate of accumulation and g
s is the rate of growth of savings, α denotes the 
SOLE, r
e and r are the expected and actual rate of profits, respectively, u
e and u are the 
expected and actual rates of capacity utilization, respectively, π is the profit share and v is 
the fixed capital-output ratio. The model stated above is replicated from Setterfield 
(2003), and comprises what Lavoie (1992, chpt.6) describes as the canonical Kaleckian 
growth model (equations [1]—[6]) augmented by a SOLE reaction function (equation 
[7]). Hence equation [1] is a standard Kaleckian investment function, equation [2] is the 
Cambridge equation, and equation [3] is true by definition. Note that, since the capital-
output ratio v is fixed by assumption, the rate of accumulation described in equation [1] is 
equivalent to the economy’s rate of growth. Equation [4] insists that the growth of 
savings adjusts to accommodate the rate of accumulation in each period, whilst equations 
[5] and [6] describe the adjustment of expectations between periods. Finally, equation [7] 
states that the SOLE – which includes the confidence that firms place in their 
expectations and their animal spirits, and hence the willingness of firms to act on the 
basis of their expectations – depends on expected and actual events in the recent past.
4
                                                 
4 See Kregel (1976). The role played by equation [7] in producing parametric variation in equation [1] that 
is induced by the effects of recent experience on animal spirits is also reminiscent of one of the three 
approaches to modelling cycles taken by Kalecki himself. See Sawyer (1996, pp.100-101). 
   5 
Combining equations [1]—[6] to produce reduced-form expressions for g
i and u 
and combining these expressions with equation [7], we arrive at the following system of 
equations: 
      123 (,,) t tt t t uuu αα−−− =             [7] 
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In Setterfield (2003), the implicit function in [7] is rendered explicit in the manner 
described in Table 1 below, with c assumed constant and: 
     
2 (,) t tt εε ε µσ   
The basic idea in Table 1 is that firms revise their SOLE in a manner that depends on: (i) 
a comparison of the difference between actual and expected events to the value of a 
conventionally determined “acceptable” margin of expectational error, c; and (ii) an 
adjustment parameter (ε) that is influenced by the convention  t ε µ , from which decision 
makers can deviate at will (hence 
2 0   t t ε σ ≠∀ ).
5
[TABLE 1 GOES HERE] 
  
Outcomes in the model described above result from the recursive interaction of 
equations [7]—[9]. Using conventional analytical techniques, Setterfield (2003, 327—31) 
shows that the model has the capacity to produce cumulative increases (or decreases) in 
the rates of growth and capacity utilization, that may occasionally be punctuated by 
                                                 
5 The convention με is described as time-dependent on the basis that, although conventions are relatively 
enduring, they can (and do) change, and in novel ways. It is this latter feature (novelty) that explains the 
absence of any equation of motion that purports to explain how με changes over time. 
See Setterfield (2003, pp.326—7) for further discussion of the process of revising the state of long 
run expectations.   6 
turning points. He thus alludes to the capacity of the model to produce growth cycles, that 
are aperiodic and of no fixed amplitude. Part of the purpose of this paper is to more 
clearly demonstrate the existence of these cycles by utilizing simulation techniques. 
 
ii) Introducing agent-based features into the model  
As intimated above, part of our motivation for simulating the model developed in 
this paper is to more clearly demonstrate its outcomes, and in particular the model’s 
description of a growth path that is subject to endogenously generated aggregate 
fluctuations. But a second advantage of the simulation method that we can also exploit is 
that it eliminates the need for simplifying assumptions designed to permit the derivation 
of a tractable analytical solution to a model. Put differently, models designed for 
simulation can be as complicated as available computing capacity allows. In what 
follows, we use this advantage to introduce “agent-based features” into our model. 
Specifically, we replace the single representative firm implicit in the structural model 
developed thus far with a multiplicity of heterogeneous firms.  
So-called agent-based computational economics (ACE) is a fast growing sub-field 
in economics.
6
                                                 
6 See, for example, Markose et al (2007), 1801-03) and Tesfatsion (2006) for (respectively) brief and more 
extensive overviews of this sub-field. 
 One of the basic ambitions of ACE is to construct dynamic economic 
models that feature multiple, heterogeneous agents. In some quarters, the impetus for this 
ambition derives from a desire for a “second generation” microfoundations project in 
macroeconomics – one that properly recognizes the substance of the SDM theorems in 
Walrasian economics and thus eschews the notion of “microfoundations” that rest on a   7 
single, representative agent (see, for example, Kirman, 1989; 1992).
7
Our introduction of agent-based features into the model described earlier focuses 
exclusively on firm behaviour, with respect to the revision of the SOLE in response to 
expectational disappointment. We distinguish between different types of firms along two 
broad dimensions. First, we differentiate between “aggressive adapters” and “cautious 
adapters”. Aggressive adapters revise their SOLEs in response to small discrepancies 
between u and u
e. In terms of the contents of Table 1, they set a low value of the 
convention c. Aggressive adapters are also characterized by short reaction periods. In 
other words, there need only be a discrepancy between u and u
e for a brief period of 
calendar time in order for this discrepancy to trigger a change in the SOLE.
 As such, the ACE 
project is avowedly “bottom up” in its approach to model building, beginning with 
(heterogeneous) individual agents and looking for macroscopic phenomena – at whatever 
level of aggregation – to arise from their interaction (see, for example, Markose et al, 
2007, p.803). The approach taken in this paper is, however, rather different. It involves 
disaggregating certain features of an aggregate structural model in order to incorporate 
some amount of agent heterogeneity. It is for this reason that we refer to the model in this 
paper as having “agent-based features”, rather than as an ACE model per se. 
8
                                                 
7 It can be argued that this second generation microfoundations project shares certain ontological affinities 
with aggregate structural modelling in macroeconomics. See Setterfield (2006). 
 Cautious 
adapters, meanwhile, display the opposite characteristics: they revise their SOLE only in 
response to large discrepancies between u and u
e (i.e., they set high values of c) observed 
over longer intervals of calendar time (i.e., they have long reaction periods). 
8 The concept of a reaction period in the adjustment of firms’ expectations is due to Harrod – see 
Asimakopulos (1991, chpt.7) for further discussion. The reaction period concept is not formally represented 
in Table 1.   8 
Second, we differentiate between firms that are more and less sensitive to 
macroeconomic events in their evaluation of the business climate. Specifically, we 
envisage all firms as revising their SOLEs in response to a mixture of both their own 
individual experience and aggregate economic outcomes. The more sensitive to 
macroeconomic events a firm is, the greater will be the weight it attaches to aggregate 
economic outcomes (relative to individual experience) in the process of revising its 
SOLE. In this way, our model resembles a blackboard system, in which individual 
agents’ behaviour is affected by both their own proprietorial knowledge (in this case, 
knowledge of their own economic performance), and shared information (which in this 
case consists of macroeconomic outcomes) derived from the “blackboard” (see, for 
example, Wooldridge, 2002, pp.301-309). Note that this blackboard structure creates 
feedback from macroeconomic outcomes to microeconomic (firm) behaviour. This 
avoids the “one way street” favoured by reductionist approaches to macroeconomics, 
according to which macro outcomes are affected by micro behaviour, but the converse 
does not apply. The blackboard is also central to the conception of agent interaction in 
our model, on which see below. 
Based on these considerations, we replace equations [7]—[9] of the structural 
model above with: 
      ( , )   ,     1,2,3 jt j jt n t n uu n αα −− ==         [7a] 
      1
i r






 = ++ 

          [8a] 






=               [9a] 
for j = 1, ..., 100, and with [7a] rendered explicit as in Table 2 below.   9 
[TABLE 2 GOES HERE] 
In Table 2, 
2 ( , )  jt t t j εε ε µσ ∀  , and the conventions cj are now modelled as: 
      j ju c βσ =  
where 0 < βj ≤ 1 and  u σ  is the standard deviation of the aggregate capacity utilization 
rate. We then use the values of βj, kj and κj to distinguish between the different types of 
firms outlined above – aggressive adapters (low βj and kj), cautious adapters (high βj and 
kj), firms that are more sensitive to aggregate economic outcomes (low κj) and firms that 
are less sensitive to aggregate economic outcomes (high κj). The precise values of these 
parameters and their correspondence to the types of firms discussed above is described in 
detail in section 2(iii)c below.
9
Before proceeding, several remarks on the model described above are in order. 
First, note that equation [9a] results from the solution of firm-specific versions of 
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jt jt gg =  for all j. This means that in every period, each individual firm generates 
(from its profits) sufficient saving to exactly fund the investment that it (independently of 
                                                 
9 Note that it is possible in principle that in any period t, none of the conditions described in the first 
column of Table 2 will be satisfied. Specifically, we might find that: 
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In such cases, the SOLE is randomly seeded to prevent it from becoming completely inert in all subsequent 
periods. Experiments with optimism and pessimism bias in this random seeding (where either 
1 jt jt jt αα ε − = +  or  1 jt jt jt αα ε − = − , respectively) revealed that such biases have no substantive effect on the 
main results reported and discussed later in the paper.   10 
saving behaviour) chooses to undertake. In other words, firms in the model above are 
akin to city states that either engage in strictly balanced trade with one another, or else 
practice autarky. Since the Kaleckian model requires only that saving equals investment 
in each period in the aggregate (as in equation [4]), 
si
jt jt gg =  can be identified as a 
sufficient but not necessary condition for our model to remain faithful to the features of 
the underlying structural model on which it is based. The condition could, therefore, be 
relaxed (on which see Gibson and Setterfield, 2010), but is retained in what follows. This 
is because we wish to retain a narrow focus on the psychological interaction of agents via 
revision of the SOLE, having identified the latter as the central “driver” of aggregate 
fluctuations on which we wish to focus. 
Second, notice that kj, βj, κj, and εj are the only agent-specific parameters in our 
model. Parameters such as gu and gr in equations [7a]—[9a] are common to all firms. 
Ultimately, then, we retain many features of the single representative firm implicit in our 
original aggregate structural model, introducing agent heterogeneity only into the SOLE 
reaction function. We focus on equation [7a] as the essential basis for distinguishing 
between agents of different types because, once again, revisions to the SOLE are the key 
“driver” of aggregate fluctuations in our model. 
Finally, note that the recursive interaction of [7a]—[9a] is subject to an important 
constraint that is not considered by Setterfield (2003), but that must inform our 
simulations. Specifically, since  [0 1] u∈ , we can identify from equation [9a] upper and 
lower bounds to the growth rate, given by: 






for uj = 1, and:   11 
      min 0
i g =  
for uj = 0. These “limits to growth” can be incorporated into our simulation model by 
insisting, following the calculation of 
i
jt g  during each iteration, that: 
      max 0   min[ , ]
i a ii
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where 
a
jt g  denotes the rate of growth that is actually used in the calculation of ujt. In order 
to ensure that our simulations are consistent with the logical bounds on u, we therefore 
add to our model the equation: 
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and replace [9a] with: 






=               [11] 
Ultimately, then, outcomes in our simulation model are described by the recursive 
interaction of equations [7a], [8a], [10], and [11]. 
 
iii) Setting parameter values and initial conditions 
  In order to proceed, we need to establish the values of the parameters in equations 
[8a], [10] and [11], set the initial values of certain variables, and operationalize equation 
[7a]. 
   12 
a) Setting parameter values 
Referring first to equations [8a] and [9a], and drawing on Lavoie and Godley 
(2001-02) and Skott and Ryoo (2008), we set:
10
gr = 0.49  gu = 0.025 
 
We also set: 
      π = 0.33  v = 3.0 
which, together with their implications for the rate of profits, are broadly congruent with 
the stylized facts of long run growth, as originally identified by Kaldor (1961). 
This leaves us with the parameter sπ. Lavoie and Godley (2001-02) set the 
corporate retention rate at 0.75, and (on p.291) the household saving rate (regardless of 
the form of household income) at 0.2. Total saving out of profit income, S, is therefore 
given by the sum of corporate retained earnings and household saving out of distributed 
earnings, or in other words: 
      0.75 (0.2)(0.25 ) S = Π+ Π  
where Π denotes total profits. The propensity to save out of profits  / sS π = Π is therefore 
given by: 
      0.75 0.25(0.2) 0.8 sπ = +=    
 
b) Initial conditions 
  Note that in the event that we replace equation [7] with: 
                                                 
10 The values taken from Lavoie and Godley (2001-02) are not reported in the article itself, but were 
provided in a private correspondence. Note that the value of gr actually set by both Lavoie and Godley 
(2001-02) and Skott and Ryoo (2007) is 0.5. We have adjusted this parameter value very slightly to 
somewhat better calibrate our model (which is different from theirs) to the stylised facts of growth and 
capacity utilization.   13 
      αα =              [7b] 
equations [1]—[6] can be solved for the steady-state rates of growth and capacity 
utilization: 
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Skott and Ryoo (2008) set  0.0075 α = . Using this parameter value, together with those 
noted earlier, we can numerically evaluate equations [12] and [13] to get: 
     
* 0.0725 g =  
     
* 0.8242 u =  
The computed value of u
* reported above can now be used as a reference point for setting 
the initial values of u and uj that we require for our simulation exercise. Hence we set: 
     
*
11 0.8242 jt t u uu −− = = =  
and: 
     
2
221 0.6857 j tttu u uu σ −−− = =−=  





                                                 
11 As will become clear in the discussion of operationalizing equation [7a] below, this will ensure that 
1 2 12   jt jt t t u j u u u u cj σ − − −− − = − =≥∀  initially. 
  We used monthly data on total industry capacity utilization in the US 1967—2007 taken from the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to compute the standard deviation of u reported above.   14 
c) Operationalizing equation [7a] 
As intimated above, equation [7a] is rendered explicit by Table 2, with: 
        0.1385 j ju j c βσ β = =  
Consistent with our setting 
*
11 0.8242 jt t u uu −− = = = , we set  1 0.0075 jt αα − = =  (which is 
the value of α consistent with our computed steady state value of u). The variables εjt are 
set as random draws from a normal distribution with mean  0.0015 ε µ =  and variance 
2 0.0005 ε σ = , moments that have been chosen in accordance with the magnitude of the 
parameter α . Note the system closure implicit in this formulation – for the sake of 
simplicity, both the mean and the variance of    j j ε ∀  are treated as time-invariant, unlike 
their original formulation in Setterfield (2003). Finally, we choose the values of βj, kj and 
κj to distinguish between the different types of firms described earlier, as follows: 
 
● βj = 0.5 and kj = 1 denotes “aggressive adapters” – firms with a greater 
inclination to be encouraged/discouraged by short-term results, and a shorter 
reaction period. 
 
● βj = 1 and kj = 3 denotes “cautious adapters” – firms that are less inclined to be 
encouraged/discouraged by short-term results, and that have longer reaction 
periods. 
 
● κj = 0.9 denotes firms whose psychology is less affected by macroeconomic 
events, and thus attach less weight to aggregate economic outcomes when 
revising their SOLEs. 
 
● κj = 0.5 denotes firms whose psychology is more affected by macroeconomic 
events, and thus attach more weight to aggregate economic outcomes when 
revising their SOLEs. 
   15 
Ultimately, then, our model distinguishes between four different types or classes of firms, 
as follows:
12
j = 1, ..., 25:    kj = 1, βj = 0.5, κj = 0.9 
 
j = 26, ..., 50:    kj = 1, βj = 0.5, κj = 0.5 
j = 51, ..., 75:    kj = 3, βj = 1, κj = 0.9 
j = 76, ..., 100:   kj = 3, βj = 1, κj = 0.5 
 
Recall that even within these types or classes of firms, the value of εjt will vary between 
individual firms. Hence our model ultimately features a population of one hundred 
different firms, the dynamics of our model depending on the heterogeneous behavioural 
responses of these firms to disappointed expectations.
  
 
iv) Determination of aggregate outcomes 
Simulating equations [7a], [8a], [10], and [11] will produce one hundred different 
values of 
i
jt g and ujt (one for each firm) at the end of each period. But of course our 
interest is ultimately in 
i
t g  and ut – and in fact, we need to know the latter in order make 
the calculations described in Table 2 and thus continue with the next iteration of our 
simulation. As such, we proceed to calculate the aggregates 
i
t g  and ut as follows. We 
                                                 
12 Note that, with reference to the calculations in Table 2, for j = 51, ..., 100 (i.e., firms for which kj = 3) we 
set αjt = αjt-1 for: (i) any value of t that is not a multiple of 3; and (ii) any value of t that is a multiple of 3, 
but for which none of the conditions of expectational disappointment in Table 2 are fully satisfied. The 
latter is necessary to prevent a behavioural “black hole” during early iterations of the model, given that we 
have only specified the values of  11 0.8242 jt t uu −− = =  and  22 0.6857 jt t uu −− = =  in the process of 
specifying initial conditions. 
   16 
begin by assuming that all firms initially have the same capital stock, which we 
normalize so that  1   j Kj = ∀ initially. Then for any subsequent period t: 










= + ∑             [14] 
and: 












=              [15] 
Finally, the value of ut can then be calculated from equation [9]. 
 
v) Summary 
  Our simulations proceed as follows. Given the initial conditions and parameter 
values outlined above, every kj periods we establish the value of εjt for each individual 
firm and, using αjt-1, calculate αjt in accordance with the criteria in Table 2. Next, we 
numerically evaluate equations [8a], [10] and [11] to produce growth and utilization rates 
for each of our individual firms. Finally, we numerically evaluate equations [14], [15] 
and [9] to produce the growth and capacity utilization rates for the aggregate economy. 
The simulation then moves forward one period and the process described above starts 
again. 
  Before discussing our simulation results, it is worth drawing attention to one final 
feature of our model: the nature of agent interaction. Agent-based simulations are 
typically dependent on the notion of locality. That is, one agent must be within a certain 
proximity of another agent in order for the two agents to interact. This notion of locality 
is usually conceptualized in terms of a grid of cells.  Our model, however, does not 
depend on proximity to facilitate the interaction of agents. Instead, each firm engages in   17 
its own individual decision making process, through which it revises its SOLE for the 
next period (or set of periods) based on its own past performance and the performance of 
the aggregate economy, derived from the “blackboard”.  It is each firm’s reference to the 
latter (in the form of the aggregate rate of capacity utilization, and as a result of  1  j j κ ≠∀  
in Table 2) that causes individual agents to interact with one another in our model. Put 
differently, instead of the “direct” interaction between individual agents typical of ACE 
models, our model exhibits “indirect” agent interaction, resulting from the sensitivity of 
individual firm behaviour to aggregate economic outcomes that are a product of the 
actions of all agents. 
 
3. Results and discussion 
Our simulation was implemented using the open source Repast (Recursive Porous 
Agent Simulation Toolkit) toolkit, developed at the University of Chicago. The version of 
Repast that we used was written in the Java programming language.  More information 
about Repast is available online at http://repast.sourceforge.net.  
 
i) Aggregate outcomes 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the aggregate rates of growth and capacity utilization 
from a representative run of our model. After about 50 periods, the behaviour of the 
model stabilizes, the economy experiencing aggregate fluctuations about average rates of 
growth and capacity utilization of 7.5% and 83.4 %, respectively.
13
                                                 
13 The latter is close to the average rate of capacity utilization in the US over the past 60 years (82.4%). 
 This is the behaviour 
anticipated by Setterfield (2003, 327—31). Recall that there are no (fixed) equilibrium   18 
rates of growth or capacity utilization towards which the economy is automatically drawn 
(or that it is compelled to orbit). Instead, “the long-run trend is but a slowly changing 
component of a chain of short-period situations: it has no independent identity” (Kalecki, 
1968, p.263).
14 Note also that the behaviour of the economy in Figures 1 and 2 bears out 
Keynes’s (1936) claim that even in the absence of such equilibrium “anchors”, a 
capitalist economy in which expectations are formed under conditions of fundamental 
uncertainty is likely to fluctuate for long periods of time at levels of economic activity 
that are below potential, but without the system ever collapsing completely. Put 
differently, rather than displaying classical stability, the economy displays resilience 
(Holling, 1973).
15
      [FIGURES 1 & 2 GO HERE] 
 
The fluctuations depicted in Figures 1 and 2 are aperiodic and their amplitude is 
non-constant. But certain regularities are, nonetheless, evident from these Figures. First, 
they show booms generally lasting considerably longer than recessions. Second, the 
longest peak-peak cycle depicted in Figures 1 and 2 lasts for about 25 periods – which 
can be interpreted, in calendar time, as an interval of about 12 years.
16
 
 These features of 
the aggregate fluctuations in Figures 1 and 2 are broadly in keeping with those of the US 
business cycle. 
                                                 
14 On the interpretation of this statement as an eschewal of traditional equilibrium analysis, see also Sawyer 
(1996, pp.103-04). 
15 The concept of resilience focuses on the durability of a system and hence its capacity for longevity. The 
key question posed by this concept is: can the system under scrutiny reproduce itself in a sufficiently 
orderly manner to ensure that it persists over time? 
16 This interpretation is based on the observations that: the capital stock expands/contracts in our model 
between periods; the capital stock is usually assumed to be constant in the short run; and the short run is 
conventionally conceived as a period of about 6—9 months.   19 
ii) Firm-specific outcomes and the size distribution of firms 
The aggregate regularities noted above are, however, not typical of the experience 
of all individual firms. Figure 3, which shows the total number of idle firms, provides the 
first indication of this. Figure 3 draws attention to an important feature of our model. 
Although it does not formally involve firm exit, the model does provide for the 
possibility of “pseudo exit” in the sense that firms can become idle (their rate of capacity 
utilization falling to zero) at any point in time. By the same token, although the model 
does not formally involve firm entry, it provides for “pseudo entry”, since the SOLE 
reaction function in Table 2 allows for the possibility of currently idle firms becoming 
economically active again in the future. In this way, although the population of firms in 
our model is fixed, the ability of firms to transition into and out of a state of economic 
activity provides for pseudo entry and exit. And as is illustrated in Figure 3, this type of 
behaviour is actually observed over the course of our simulations. 
      [FIGURE 3 GOES HERE] 
Indeed, Figure 3 shows an increasing number of firms becoming inactive over 
time, providing prima facie evidence that the aggregate economy is becoming dominated 
by an ever smaller number of firms over time.
17 This is borne out by Figures 4—7, which 
illustrate the size distribution of firms (as measured by the quantity of capital that firms 
own) at various points during our representative simulation.
18
                                                 
17 Note that, although economically inactive firms retain their capital (which does not depreciate), their 
inactivity means that their (constant) stock of wealth will become progressively smaller relative to the 
capital stock of the economy as a whole. 
 The distributions in Figures 
4—7 are suggestive of power laws of the form: 
18 In order to construct the size distributions in Figures 4-7, several functions were written to automatically 
“bin” all of the firms from each period based on the relative size of their capital stocks and the maximum 
permitted number of bins.  The maximum bin number was set to 12 for the execution of this analysis.     20 
        () px x
β −            [16] 
where x denotes the size of the capital stock owned by firms. Power laws (and in 
particular, the Pareto distribution) are thought to characterize numerous size distributions 
in economics (Reed, 2001; Gabaix, 2009).
19
        [FIGURES 4—7 GO HERE] 
 They are empirically well established as 
features of the size distribution of firms (Steindl, 1965; Ijiri and Simon, 1977) and the 
size distribution of wealth (Pareto, 1897) – both of which are effectively being 
represented in Figures 4—7. 
In order to subject the power law hypothesis to further scrutiny, we first estimate 
the scaling parameter β in equation [16] for the size distribution of firms in each period of 
our representative simulation, using the maximum likelihood technique outlined by 
Clauset et al (2007, pp.4-6).
20
       
 We then determine the goodness of fit of our estimated 
power law to the original data by computing  the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic: 
min
m a x () ()
xx D Sx Px
≥ = −  
where S(x) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the data for all observations 
that satisfy  min xx ≥ , P(x) is the CDF of our estimated power law for  min xx ≥ , and xmin is 
the lower bound of the estimated power law (Clauset et al, 2007, pp.8, 11). The KS 
statistic measures the maximum distance between the CDFs of the data and our estimated 
power law relationship – so the higher is D, the worse is the goodness of fit of the power 
                                                 
19 The Pareto distribution is sometimes referred to as the “Pareto principle” or the “80-20 rule” (according 
to which 20% of the population owns 80% of society’s wealth). 
20 The actual relationship estimated is  () p x Bx
β − =  where B is a constant. The power law analysis 
was executed using the plfit.r library, which was written by Aaron Clauset of the Santa Fe Institute and 
University of New Mexico. This library, and more information about it, is available at 
http://www.santafe.edu/~aaronc/powerlaws/.   21 
law. Bearing this in mind, the KS statistics for each of the 250-plus periods of our 
representative simulation are illustrated in Figure 8. 
        [FIGURE 8 GOES HERE] 
  Excluding the first few periods, the values of the KS statistics reported in Figure 8 
appear uniformly low throughout our representative simulation. This lends support to the 
claim that the size distribution of firms generated by our model conforms to a power law. 
Of course, this is something of a value judgment: there is no established critical value of 
the KS statistic above which it is conventional to reject the hypothesis that the power law 
is a good fit to the data. It is possible to calculate a p-value to quantify the probability that 
a data set was drawn from a particular (estimated) power law distribution. As explained 
by Clauset et al (2007, pp.11-12), this involves a Monte Carlo procedure in which we 
would need to generate  2 1
4ε
 synthetic data sets, where ε is the difference between the 
estimated p-value and its true value that we are willing tolerate. While this is well within 
the possibilities of modern High Performance Computing, it still leaves us with the 
problem of subjectively choosing a critical p-value that we deem sufficiently small to 
reject the hypothesis of a power law. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that the 
evidence that real-world size distributions conform to power laws is not incontrovertible. 
For example, Clauset et al (2007, pp.16-20) reject the hypothesis that the size distribution 
of wealth (specifically, the aggregate net worth of the richest individuals in the US in 
2003) conforms to a power law. It seems, then, that the best we will ever be able to say is 
that there is some evidence that the size distribution of firms generated by our model 
conforms to a power law, just as there is some evidence that this same size distribution 
conforms to a power law in real-world data.   22 
  Nevertheless, even this tentative result is interesting in the context of this paper. 
The cyclical behaviour of the growth and utilization rates discussed in the previous sub-
section is more or less predictable based on the underlying structure of our model (see, 
for example, Setterfield, 2003, pp.327—31). In this instance, the process of simulation 
serves to better illustrate a property of the model that is already understood to 
(potentially) exist. However, nothing in the structure of our model pre-empts or in any 
way suggests that we are likely to observe a size distribution of firms that conforms to a 
power law. This feature of our model – which also appears to be a feature of real-world 
size distributions of firms – emerges spontaneously from our simulation results. 
  One final feature of Figure 8 that merits discussion is the apparent tendency of the 
value of the KS statistic to drift upwards over time. Interpreted literally, this suggests that 
the goodness of fit of the power law declines as our simulation progresses. However, 
there may be a simple explanation for this. The increasing value of the KS statistic may 
be explained by the decreasing number of “bins” into which firms are sorted as our 
simulation progresses. In order to properly estimate a power law, there can be no empty 
(0 sized) bins in the histograms in Figures 4-7.  It is therefore necessary to choose the 
largest number of bins that will result in each of the individual bins containing at least 
one firm.  However, as the number of small firms grows, and the gap between the very 
large firms and the very small firms becomes larger, it is necessary to use fewer and 
fewer ever larger bins to prevent the emergence of empty bins.
21
                                                 
21 This is evident from inspection of Figures 4-7. 
 This reduces the number 
of data points that we have, resulting in a poorer quality fit for the power law reflected in 
a higher value of D in Figure 8.  If this explanation is correct, it provides us with a 
compelling reason to use many more firms in future simulations, in order to improve the   23 
spectrum or breadth of our data and thus increase the accuracy of our analysis of the size 
distribution of firms. 
 
4. Conclusion 
  Drawing on Malcolm Sawyer’s career-long interest in the development of 
Kaleckian macroeconomics as a source of inspiration, the purpose of this paper has been 
to construct and simulate a Keynes-Kalecki model of cyclical growth with agent-based 
features. Based on the propensity for decision makers confronted by fundamental 
uncertainty to revise their “state of long run expectations” in response to short-run events, 
it has been shown that the economy can experience aggregate fluctuations in its rate of 
growth that are aperiodic and of no fixed amplitude. While this observation merely 
corroborates and better illustrates the results of an earlier study based on a similar model, 
the incorporation of agent heterogeneity into our model allows us to also explore other 
features of the economy – most notably, the size distribution of firms. We have shown 
that there is evidence to suggest that the size distribution of firms produced by our 
simulation model – like the size distribution of firms in real-world economies – conforms 
to a power law. Unlike the observation of cyclical growth, this outcome is not at all 
obvious from the basic construction of our model, and might instead be considered an 
emergent property of its operation. 
  Perhaps the most interesting feature of our model, however, is methodological. 
Markose et al (2007, p.1803) list four prominent features of the “ACE revolution” in 
economics, two of which (“heterogeneous (instead of homogenous) decision processes as 
a characteristic of socio-economic systems and the statistical non-Gaussian properties of   24 
their macro-level outcomes; [and] adaptive and evolutionary dynamics under limited 
information and rationality”) are exhibited by the model developed above. And yet ours 
is not an ACE model per se, but rather an aggregate structural model with “agent based 
features”: it involves disaggregating a structural model rather than the “bottom up” 
approach characteristic of ACE; and it involves indirect interaction (which does not 
depend on locality) rather than locality-dependent direct interaction amongst 
heterogeneous agents. The methodological question that these observations prompt is: are 
aggregate structural models with agent-based features a potentially useful but relatively 
under-exploited frontier of the increases in computing power that have facilitated the 
development of ACE? Our tentative answer to this question is affirmative. First, the 
results presented in this paper suggest that exploitation of this frontier offers obvious 
advantages for aggregate structural modellers (including, but not limited to, Kaleckians). 
Specifically, it presents the opportunity to generate results (regarding the size distribution 
of firms, for example) that conventional aggregate structural models cannot, by their very 
nature, produce. Second, exploitation of the same frontier may well be advantageous to 
the development of ACE. This claim stems from observations such as that of Tesfatsion 
(2006, p.??), that “it is not clear how well ACE models will be able to scale up to provide 
empirically and practically useful models of large scale systems with many thousands of 
agents”.
22
                                                 
22 Similar reservations have been expressed by Hartley (2001) who, in his review of Gallegati and Kirman 
(1999), questions “whence comes our certainty that it is possible to build tractable models of the 
macroeconomy from the ground up? Maybe the real lesson of the book is that it may not be possible to 
build such models, that we can certainly build better microeconomic models than those used in the 
representative agent literature, but that such models do not directly translate into macroeconomics” 
(Hartley, 2001, pp.F146-7). 
 The point to be made here is that the approach taken in this paper – which 
clearly does yield recognizable macroeconomic results – may represent a useful   25 
compromise between aggregate structural modelling and “bottom up” ACE modelling, 
either at this particular stage in the development of the latter or possibly even in the long 
term.   26 
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Table 1: Revisions to the state of long run expectations in response to disappointed 
expectations. 
 
          Nature of Disappointment                       Value of  t α  
                 12 tt uuc −− −≥    
                      1 tt t αα ε − = +                    12 tt uu c −− − >−  
And          23 tt uu c −− − ≤−  
                 12 tt uu c −− − ≤−    
                      1 tt t αα ε − = −                    12 tt uuc −− −<  
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Table 2: Agent-based revisions to the state of long run expectations in response to 
disappointed expectations. 
 
                          Nature of Disappointment      Value of  jt α  






jt i jt i t i t i j
ii jj
u u uu c
kk
κκ
− −− − −−
==
−




    






jt i jt i t i t i j
ii jj
u u uu c
kk
κκ
− −− − −−
==
−
− + − >− ∑∑  








j tk i j tk i tk i tk i j
ii jj
u u uu c
kk
κκ
−− −− − −− −− −
==
−
− + − ≤− ∑∑  






jt i jt i t i t i j
ii jj
u u uu c
kk
κκ
− −− − −−
==
−
− + − ≤− ∑∑  
 
 
     
1 jt jt jt αα ε − = −  






jt i jt i t i t i j
ii jj
u u uu c
kk
κκ
− −− − −−
==
−
− + −< ∑∑  








j tk i j tk i tk i tk i j
ii jj
u u uu c
kk
κκ
−− −− − −− −− −
==
−




   32 











   33 











   34 









   35 






Figure 8: Goodness of Fit of Estimated Power Laws Over Time 
 
 